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Abstract. In this article a number of elements of a general model of quality assessment i  higher 
education are presented. On the one hand these lements are put in a historical context of quality 
assessment i  Medieval universities and, on the other hand, deduced from the recent experiences with 
quality assessment i  both North-American d Western European countries. With respect to the 
historical context a distinction is made between the intrinsic and the extrinsic values of higher education. 
Two types of quality assessment related to these values are also distinguished. Concerning the recent 
experiences with quality assessment systems, the practices in the U.S.A., Canada, France, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom are explored. In the final section the general mode of quality 
assessment is discussed in the context of the distinction between the intrinsic and the extrinsic values of 
higher education. 
The historical roots of quality assessment in higher education 
From the early days of higher education on, the assessment of the quality of its 
processes and products has been an important focus of attention for higher 
education institutions. In this historical attention for quality a certain tension is 
found which we nowadays till experience and which sometimes appears to be the 
source of heated ebates. 
Already in Medieval higher education a distinction can be made between two 
extreme models of quality assessment. Neither of these two models is of course 
found in the actual history of European higher education. The models rather point 
to two crucial dimensions of quality assessment in higher education. Referring to 
their historical backgrounds, we will call one model the French model of vesting 
control in an extemal authority (Cobban 1988, p. 124). The other model we will call 
the English model of a self-governing community of fellows. 
The French model can be illustrated by the dramatic struggle for autonomy by 
the University of Paris in the early thirteenth century. It was the chancellor of the 
cathedral of Nrtre Dame, acting as the delegate of the bishop of Pads, who 
represented the then dominating episcopal outlook that the universities should be 
seen as 'ecclesiastical colonies.' The universities were viewed as higher forms of 
education that were, however, to be integrated in the ecclesiastical structure and 
that were to remain under episcopal authority. The chancellor of the cathedral of 
N6tre Dame was an external official set above the masters' guild. As such he 
claimed the authority to grant or to withhold the teaching license and he claimed 
the right to decide about he content of studies. The masters fought he chancellor's 
authority. And after a long and bitter conflict, Pope Gregory IX in his bull called 
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Parens Scientiarum (1231) finally made an end to the dominance of the bishop and 
the chancellor over the masters' guild (Cobban 1975, pp. 76-84). 
The English model of self-governance has its origins in the aspirations of the 
masters at the Medieval Universities of Oxford and Cambridge to be completely 
independent of external jurisdiction. English Medieval colleges were sovereign, 
self-governing communities of fellows. In the English colleges the fellows 
themselves had the right to remove unsuitable masters and to co-opt new members. 
It was up to the community of the fellows to judge the quality of their colleagues. 
The French model may be considered to be the archetype of quality assessment 
in terms of accountability. In the French model the power to decide what should be 
studied and who could be allowed to teach at the university was in the hands of an 
external authority. The guild masters were accountable tothe chancellor for the 
contents of their teaching. The English model is the expression of what we 
nowadays call: quality assessment by means of peer review. The masters decided 
among themselves what should be taught and who should teach. 
The French and the English models can, we think, be considered to be two 
important dimensions of any present-day system of quality assessment in higher 
education. Both the dimension of providing accountability (the French model) and 
the dimension of peer review (the English model) are crucial elements of present- 
day quality management systems in higher education. 
These two dimensions refer to the two subcategories of the general concept of 
quality that have always played a central role in higher education. Looking at the 
history of higher education, it can be argued that higher education has always had 
both intrinsic and extrinsic qualities. The intrinsic qualities refer to the ideals of the 
search for truth and the pursuit of knowledge. The extrinsic qualities are related to 
the services higher education institutions provide to society. Already in the early 
days of higher education, these two categories of quality can be found. Higher 
education i stitutions have always espoused the values and ideals of the search for 
truth and the disinterested pursuit of knowledge. At the same time, through the 
centuries the institutions of higher education have been able to respond to the needs 
of society. Higher education institutions have adapted themselves with great 
flexibility to the changing needs and opportunities in their environment. By 
combining both intrinsic and extrinsic qualities, higher education institutions have 
been able to show a remarkable historical persistence. The combination of intrinsic 
and extrinsic qualities has helped higher education institutions to capture their 
important place in history and society. 
The recent call of higher education quality assessment 
Since the early 1980s quality has become a central concept in many discussions on 
higher education. In the United States and Canada the debates on the various 
approaches and instruments with respect to quality assessment have intensified. In 
the United Kingdom (in 1984) quality was declared to be a principal objective for 
higher education. In France the 'Comitg National d'Evaluation' was set up. In the 
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Netherlands an influential policy-paper was published in which quality played a 
major role. In Denmark, Finland, Spain and several other countries the first steps 
were taken to design a quality assessment system (Neave and van Vught 1991, van 
Vught and Westerheijden 1993). 
There are various factors that can explain this recent increase of the attention for 
quality in higher education. An important factor is the expansion of the various 
higher education systems. The rapid growth of the student-body and the 
accompanying increase of the number of fields of study, departments and even 
whole new institutions have triggered questions about he amount and direction of 
public expenditure for higher education. Another (related) factor lies in the simple 
fact that the limits of public expenditure have been reached in many countries. 
Budget-cuts and retrenchment operations automatically lead to questions about he 
relative quality of processes and products in higher education. A third factor 
concerns the transition process to technology-based conomies, which in many 
countries brings along policies to guide student demand to fields that are perceived 
to be important for further economic development (Neave 1986, p. t68). 
These factors indicate that during the last ten years or so, especially the extrinsic 
values of higher education have driven many governments o policies of quality 
control in higher education. The increasing costs of higher education systems had 
to be legitimised by clearly definable societal benefits. And for this, mechanisms 
and procedures of quality assessment were deemed to be necessary. 
New systems of quality assessment and quality control have been (or are being) 
developed in several countries. But, while it may be clear that the extrinsic values 
of higher education are important factors timulating these developments, it appears 
to be difficult o combine in the new systems of quality assessment on the one hand 
the government's goals regarding the national higher education system and on the 
other hand the views and characteristics of the higher education i stitutions. 
In this article we will briefly discuss the experiences with quality assessment in a 
few relevant countries. From this discussion we will try to deduce a number of 
elements of a general model of higher education quality assessment, which may be 
applicable in various contexts. Finally, we will present a brief analysis of this 
general model, using the concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic qualities that were 
distinguished before. 
Experiences in the U.S.A. and Canada 
As is well known, in the United States and Canada, the market is the dominant 
form of coordination i  higher education. Competition between higher education 
institutions i  generally accepted. Higher education institutions are organised on a 
basis which to a considerable xtent is similar to private corporations. There is 
considerable power at the top of the higher educational institution. And these 
institutions have a board and a president, rather like private corporations. Although 
the influence of governmental steering is not completely absent, compared to for 
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instance, continental Europe this influence is limited. The higher education 
institutions in the United States and Canada are supposed to regulate themselves. 
If they do not, they will lose resources, students and scholars to their 
competitors. 
In the United States the growing diversity in institutional forms and the initial 
lack of centrally defined standards led by the late nineteenth century to a level of 
chaos in the US higher education system. If the institutions would not have 
addressed this increasing level of chaos, strong government intervention would 
probably have become unavoidable. Because such an intervention was not 
attractive to the higher education institutions, the institutions took the initiative to 
develop themselves two processes of quality assessment (Kells 1989). 
The first process of quality assessment is accreditation. Accreditation of a higher 
education institution or of a specific study programme within an institution consists 
of a procedure of self-assessment by the organisation seeking accreditation, 
followed by a visit of a team of external assessors and a final discussion, by a peer- 
board using pre-existing accreditation standards, on the question whether or not to 
give accreditation. In the U.S. accreditation has two forms. The first is institutional 
accreditation, conducted by regional bodies that are controlled by the higher 
education institutions themselves. The second form of accreditation is specialised 
accreditation conducted nationally by profession controlled bodies. 
The second process of quality assessment in American higher education is the 
intra-institutional process of systematic review of study programmes. This review 
process is being used by universities: to assess programme quality, to enhance 
institutional decision-making, and in some cases to provide a basis for the 
redistribution of marginal resources within the institution (Barak 1982, Kells and 
van Vught 1988, Kells 1989). Program review may become an element of the 
broader accreditation process, but this is not necessarily the case. 
In Canada, quality assessment in higher education is somewhat differently 
organised. In Canada quality assessment has not so much taken the form of a full 
process of accreditation. In this country two crucial elements of the U.S. type of 
accreditation have been chosen to be part of the dominant quality assessment 
approach: self-assessment and the visits by peers. For example, the technical 
schools and community colleges in British Columbia have employed such an 
approach, as has the provincial university of Alberta (Holdaway 1988). 
So, in higher education systems with an emphasis on market coordination and a 
high level of institutional autonomy (at least compared to some continental 
European systems) we find an approach to quality assessment in which the 
following elements can be found: 
a) a process of self-evaluation. In some cases the assessment is limited to this 
element. This is especially the case when the assessment takes the form of an intra- 
institutional review process; 
b) a review by peers, usually in the form of a visit by a team of external assessors; 
c) finally, especially in the U.S., these two elements are brought ogether in a wider 
system of accreditation in which (except for self-evaluation and review by peers) 
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one other element is crucial: the formulation of standards that are used to make the 
decision to give or withhold accreditation. 
Developments in Western Europe 
Contrary to the United States and Canada, the predominant form of coordination i
the Western European higher education systems in many countries till is state 
control. With the exception of Britain, the Western European higher education 
systems have been heavily controlled by governments for a long period of time. In 
these centrally controlled continental Western European higher education systems 
the institutional autonomy was rather limited (and in many cases still is) and the 
funding was and is generally provided by the state. 
During the 1970s and the 1980s the Western European higher education systems 
have been confronted with a number of far-reaching changes. Most of these 
changes can be related in one way or another to a shift in governmental strategies 
towards higher education. A major underlying political force was the rise to power 
of conservative governments in many of these countries. The so-called 'value-for- 
money' approach of these governments with respect to the public sector led to the 
end of the more or less unconditional government funding of public higher 
education. In practice this implied, among other things, that public funding of 
higher education was increasingly becoming linked to the performance of higher 
education institutions. As a consequence, the question of how to assess the 
performance, or quality, of higher education became one of the central issues in 
Western European higher education i  the last decade. 
A second important development in higher education policy-making in Western 
Europe is the rise of the governmental strategy of 'self-regulation' (van Vught 
1989, Neave and van Vught 1991). During the second half of the 1980s, the 
ministries of education and higher education institutions especially in the countries 
of northwestern Europe have agreed upon the desirability of more self-regulation 
by the higher education institutions. In this period, several governments have 
advocated eregulation by central ministries and increased autonomy of and 
competitiveness among the higher education i stitutions. 
The establishment of a governmental strategy directed towards more autonomy 
for higher education institutions was generally motivated by governments by the 
wish to stimulate the innovative behaviour of higher education institutions and 
especially to stimulate their responsiveness to the perceived needs of the economy 
and of society. Also, there was to be a greater awareness on the part of society and 
the public about the quality of study programmes, which implied that credible 
systems of quality assessment should be developed. 
In some Western European countries new attempts to set up quality assessment 
systems arose from the developments described above. A quality assessment 
system was either initiated by the central governmental authorities (as was the case 
in France) or it was negotiated between governmental ctors and the leaders of 
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higher education institutions (as was the case in the Netherlands). Together with the 
United Kingdom, these two countries offer a good overview of the recent 
experiences with quality control in Western Europe. Let us briefly describe the 
developments in these three countries. 
France 
The President of the French Republic and an act of parliament brought into being 
the Comitd National d'Evaluation (CNE) in 1985 as a result of the so-called Loi 
Savary. It was, accordingly, set up in a spirit of concern about the dysfunctions of 
the traditional, centralised, system of quality control: lack of actual autonomy, 
uniformity, rigidity, bureaucracy, etc. (Staropoli 1991, p. 45). Given its position in 
terms of constitutional law, the CNE is a government agency, but it only reports to 
the President, so it is independent of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Education 
and other executive agencies. 
The CNE quality assessment procedure consists of two parts: institution-wide 
evaluations and 'horizontal,' disciplinary reviews. The evaluations are not specific 
down to the individual level, nor do they assess courses: these two levels are 
covered by traditional mechanisms. Where necessary and possible, the CNE makes 
use of existing evaluations and control reports of other agencies that do examine 
these and other aspects (e.g., CNRS Research laboratories). The tasks of the CNE 
are not only concerned with quality assessment, but also with judging, quite 
generally, the results of the contracts established between higher education 
institutions and the Ministry of Education. Many factual indicators are, therefore, at 
the basis of the CNE evaluations, including information as diverse as research and 
finance. Evaluation results are not used directly for making reallocations of funds, 
though through the contract negotiations and the annual budget negotiations, a firm 
link with decision-making is established. 
The CNE makes institution-wide valuations of education, research and 
management, the argument being that research and teaching are interdependent 
primary activities of higher education institutions. Also, other aspects of the higher 
education institution as an environment for teaching and research are examined. 
Evaluations are undertaken after an invitation by the higher education institution; it 
is a Voluntary procedure, though the CNE has the right to undertake the evaluations 
it wants. The CNE 'tours' all institutions every eight years approximately. Each 
audit results in a report on the institution, making recommendations to the persons 
responsible for institutional management. These reports are public. They are sent, 
among others, to the ministers responsible for the higher education institutions 
visited, so as to assure the reports' roles in the negotiations mentioned above. The 
whole procedure, from invitation to report, takes about one year (see also Neave 
1991). 
The second part of the CNE procedure (the disciplinary reviews) consists, first, 
of self-evaluation reports provided by the institution to be visited. These reports are 
confidential (and include names of individuals). Second, the CNE, the institution 
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involved and government offices collect statistical data. With those two sources and 
its own visit to the location, an external peer committee makes qualitative 
judgements, resulting in a public report. The committees work 'horizontally,' 
reviewing all courses in France in a broad disciplinary area. 
Every year, the CNE presents a summary report o the President of the French 
Republic. In the reports the CNE gives an overview of its institution-wide 
evaluations. However, no explicit rankings are made of the institutions audited. The 
character of the reports is sometimes judged to be descriptive rather than analytical 
(Guin 1990). 
The Netherlands 
Following the publication of the policy paper entitled Higher Education: Autonomy 
and Quality (1985), the relationships between the Ministry of Education and 
Science and the higher education institutions in the Netherlands were restructured. 
In exchange for a greater degree of financial and managerial utonomy, the higher 
education institutions would prove to society that they delivered quality education. 
Originally, the government intended this evaluation to be executed by the, partly 
newly-established, Inspectorate for Higher Education (IHO). In subsequent 
discussions the umbrella organisations of the higher education institutions, the 
Association of Cooperating Universities in the Netherlands (VSNU) for the 
universities and the HBO Council for non-university higher education institutions, 
took that responsibility on themselves. The IHO was by-passed through that 
compromise and was largely left with the task of 'meta-evaluation': evaluation of 
the evaluation, and evaluation of the follow up on assessment results by the higher 
education institutions. A pilot project was held by the VSNU in 1988. As a 
consequence of the evaluation of the pilot project some adjustments were made and 
the quality assessment procedure became operational in 1989. In 1990 the HBO 
Council started a procedure in the non-university sector that, although not 
completely similar to the VSNU approach, is based on the same basic principles. 
For reasons of brevity, we shall concentrate h re on the VSNU system. The focal 
point of the VSNU quality assessment procedure is the visiting committee that 
reviews all study programmes in a given area of knowledge in the country; the 
approach is by disciplinary fields, rather than institutional. In a fixed six year cycle, 
in principle all study programmes are covered by the procedure. 
In preparation for the visiting committee, ach participating study programme is
required to write a self-evaluation. As the aims of the self-evaluation are not only to 
prepare the faculty for the visiting committee, but also to stimulate internal quality 
management (Vroeijenstijn and Acherman 1990, p. 88), the content of the self- 
evaluation is not fixed completely: the faculties and departments o be evaluated 
can stress points which are important to them. However, for reasons of 
comparability, a fixed format is given by the VSNU checklist (VSNU 1990). The 
self-studies of all participating study programmes are collected by the visiting 
committee before it starts on its 'tour' of the country. 
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The visiting committees consist of about seven members, including at least one 
foreign expert in the field. The members of the committee are proposed by the 
collective deans of the participating faculties and nominated by the boards of the 
VSNU. The committee visits each study programme for, normally, two or two and 
a half days. During this period the committee speaks with representatives of all 
interest groups in the faculty, including students. To enable non-selected voices to 
be heard, an 'open hour' is part of the procedure. Subjects for the talks are taken 
from the self-evaluation, from the committee's prior visits and other (usually 
considerable) knowledge of the field and the faculty, and whatever else comes up 
during the visit. At the end of the visit, the chair gives an oral, temporary 
judgement about he quality of the study programme. Based on the written version 
of this judgement and the (factual) comments of the study programmes, the visiting 
committee then writes its final report. The report usually contains a general part, 
stating problems, outlooks, expectations and recommendations pertaining to all of 
the field, and chapters about he individual study programmes. 
As a rule, the recommendations i  the visiting committee r port lead to measures 
for improvement of the study programmes, together with measures taken based on 
the self-evaluations in anticipation of the visiting committee (IHO 1992, Frederiks 
et al. 1993). 
As a result of the agreement of 1986, the Ministry of Education and Science has 
not taken any action on the basis of the visiting committees' judgements. It was 
thought hat the introduction of the system should not be hampered by direct 
consequences for decision-making and funding. Direct links to funding and other 
aspects of government decision-making would lead only too easily to strategic 
behaviour on the part of the higher education institutions, which would undermine 
the quality assessment system completely. 
The United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, two models of quality management have been developed 
since the enlargement of government influence over higher education i  the 1960s. 
The first model applies to the sector of non-university higher education, the 
polytechnics and colleges. Much later, quality assessment was extended to 
university higher education too. We shall characterise these models in their 
chronological order. After doing so, we will discuss the new arrangements with 
respect o quality assessment that are a result of the 1991 White Paper Higher 
Education: A New Framework, formalised in the Further and Higher Education 
Act of 1992. 
Since the first half of the 1960s non-university higher education in the UK was 
under the aegis of the Council of National Academic Awards (Brennan 1990). Like 
in other countries, quality in this higher education sector was also controlled by Her 
Majesty's Inspectorate (HMI), which continued to exist, with its own 
responsibilities and methods, alongside the new CNAA. The main characterising 
element of HMI procedures was classroom observation. 
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The CNAA, a government-initiated body, was independent: it obtained its own 
royal charter in 1964. It was a degree-awarding body, giving out degrees of a 
professedly equal level to those of universities (bachelor's degree). The CNAA 
validated proposed courses in colleges and polytechnics ex ante and reviewed them 
quinquennially. For a long time the committees consisted of peers, i.e., academics 
working in the same area of knowledge but in other higher education institutions 
(colleges, polytechnics and universities), plus, if applicable, representatives of the 
relevant profession or industry. These committees based their visit on detailed 
written information regarding the structure and content of the course, ways and 
methods of teaching and student assessment, and available resources (research and 
teaching qualifications of the staff members who were expected to become 
involved, physical equipment, etc.). In the frequent cases of disapproval by the 
committee a new round, based on an amended proposal, would start. 
The peer review of courses was complemented by a, usually quinquennial, 
review of the institution's own operational (i.e., not just existing on paper) 
mechanisms to assure the level of its courses. Later, since 1988, the CNAA 
accredited a number of polytechnics to validate their own courses (undergraduate 
and postgraduate degree level) through this procedure of monitoring the 
institutional quality management procedures. 
Based on this tradition of government-independent quality assessment, he 
CNAA and the funding organisation of the public sector higher education 
institutions, the Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC), tried to 
liberalise the evaluation culture developing in the 1980s, which was becoming 
more and more government-centred, by taking account of the institution's goals and 
aims. 
When, in 1992, the binary system in the UK was abolished, the CNAA ceased to 
exist. Its activities ended with the academic year 1991-1992. 
The turning points in quality management for British universities were two 
reports in the mid-1980s: the Reynolds report to the Universities' Grants 
Committee (UGC) and the Jarratt report o the Committee of Vice Chancellors and 
Principals (CVCP). In the Reynolds report criteria were laid down for internal 
quality management systems which all universities would be required to introduce 
in the following years. The Jarratt report was the focal point for the discussion of 
performance indicators and their role in quality-based funding. 
The Academic Audit Unit (AAU) was introduced in 1990-1991 by the umbrella 
organisation of the universities, the Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals 
(CVCP), reputedly to counter the threat of Her Majesty's Inspectorate (HMI) to 
extend its control to the universities (Young 1990). Before, each university 
individually took care of its own quality control. The external, comparative aspect 
in this system consisted of the external examiners. Views on the effectiveness of
these external examiners in terms of quality assessment differ. However, this 
approach was judged to be an insufficient mechanism for providing accountability 
towards ociety in general and to the government in particular. The AAU had to fill 
this gap. 
The AAU activities were a form of 'meta-evaluation': it did not evaluate the 
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quality of higher education, but the quality of the institution's evaluation methods. 
The core of the AAU quality assessment procedure consisted on an on-site visit by 
an audit team. The teams consisted of academics, as a rule two or three persons. 
The choice of institutions to visit resulted from 'negotiated invitation.' In 
preparation for its (usually three day) visit the audit team received written 
information from the university on the quality assessment systems it had, plus - if 
requested - a small number of examples of the application of these systems. The 
AAU had a checklist based on good practice against which to assess an institution's 
quality assessment mechanisms. From this documentation together with the 
information gathered uring the on-site visit the audit team drafted a short report 
for the university as a whole and, if necessary, confidential reports on 'sensitive 
issues' to the Vice-Chancellor. Following the institution's comments on this draft a 
final version was written of the official report. The AAU did not itself publish the 
report, but the university was encouraged todo so. 
The changes following the 1991 White Paper have led to profound changes in 
the organisational structure of the intermediate l vel in the UK higher education 
system (between the individual institutions and the department of education); new 
procedures for these organisations have been drawn up. 
Organisationally, the changes include primarily the following. First, the 
collective of heads of higher education institutions established the Higher 
Education Quality Council (HEQC) with a Division of Quality Audit, into which 
the AAU has been subsumed. The work of the CNAA in supporting and enhancing 
quality will also be developed for all of higher education by this Council. Second, 
the former funding councils (UFC and PCFC) have been transformed into three 
new funding councils, one for England, one for Wales and one for Scotland. These 
have set up Quality Assessment Committees to assist them in making funding 
decisions based on the quality of teaching in the separate institutions. 
The White Paper also has led to the introduction of very specific meanings for 
the following terms in the British context: 
9 quality control: 'mechanisms within institutions for maintaining and enhancing 
the quality of their provisions'; 
9 quality audit: 'external scrutiny aimed at providing guarantees that institutions 
have suitable quality control mechanisms in place' (this is the responsibility of the 
HEQC); 
9 quality assessment: 'external review of, and judgements about, the quality of 
teaching and learning in institutions' (this is the responsibility of the funding 
councils). 
In this way higher education institutions will be audited by one agency, and 
assessed by another. The quality audits by the HEQC resemble the basic principles 
of  the AAU: an investigation of the quality control mechanisms and policies 
present in the individual institutions by a small team of external experts, including 
in loco audit trails to examine the practice of quality control. 
Although on a more detailed level differences can be found between the 
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approaches of the English and the Scottish funding councils (the Scottish funding 
council taking, e.g., a slightly more explicitly developmental and quality 
improvement oriented stance than the English one), on a general evel they are 
fairly similar. Basically, the faculties are asked to provide information about 
themselves, in writing, on a limited number of indicators, and on their programme, 
resulting in a claim for 'excellent' or 'satisfactory' quality of teaching. The funding 
councils will compose small visiting committees from a pool of experts (primarily 
disciplinary peers), to assess and visit all institutions claiming excellence, all those 
where - based on information available to the funding council - weaknesses may 
be encountered, and to examine a sample of other institutions. Each visiting 
committee is selected to visit one institution; no effort is made to set up a nation- 
wide system of comparisons. The committees' judgements are summarised as 
'excellent,' satisfactory' or 'unsatisfactory. '1 In what way, through which 
'formula' (if any), the judgements will inform the funding decisions is not yet 
completely clear. 
To what extent he practices of quality audit and quality assessment amount o 
the same thing in practice, cannot be told yet. Some fears exist that, e.g., an audit 
trail into the practice of quality control in a faculty will closely resemble the quality 
assessment of that same faculty. 
A general model of higher education quality assessment 
Overlooking the experiences with quality assessment systems both in the USA and 
Canada, and in the Western European countries just mentioned, it can be argued 
that in all these systems a number of similar elements are found that can be 
combined into the core of a general higher education quality assessment system. 
This general model thereby becomes an overall descriptive summary of the similar 
elements of several idiosyncratic systems. The various systems described before (as 
well as all other systems, not mentioned here) of course all have their own 
characteristics that apply to their own specific circumstances. But these systems 
also show some similar elements that can be combined into a general model. 
What then could be common elements of a general model of higher education 
quality assessment? 
A first element concerns the managing agent (or agents) of the quality 
assessment system. Such an agent should be independent and have the 
responsibility to manage the system at a meta-level. The meta-level agent should be 
the coordinator of the quality assessment system, acting independently from 
government politics and policies and not having the task to impose upon the 
institutions an approach that the government deems to be necessary. In the Western 
European context, the meta-level agent should preferably have some legal basis. In 
the higher education system of the USA, the accreditation agencies have the form 
of voluntary associations. But even in the USA there was some link to the legal 
structure through the recognition of accrediting agencies by the Council of 
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Postsecondary Accreditation (COPA). Its coordinating task should imply (after 
consultation with the institutions) the formulation of procedures and formats that 
can be used by the institutions. In these procedures and formats consistent 
statistical information can be indicated as highly relevant. The experiences in the 
various countries in Western Europe show that exactly this meta-level role is of 
great importance to obtain acceptance of the system. The Academic Audit Unit 
(AAU) in the United Kingdom neither inspected courses nor programmes, nor did 
it validate courses. The AAU only monitored and commented on the mechanisms 
by which the institutions themselves assured the quality of the programmes they 
offer. Similarly, in the procedures used by the Council for National Academic 
Awards (CNAA) since 1985, the institutions were encouraged to undertake their 
own quality review processes. While the CNAA kept its responsibility for the final 
approval of the courses leading to its awards, the quality assessment mechanism 
first of all had to do with the institution's capacity to identify its strengths and 
weaknesses and to improve its quality. In the new British systems, two meta-level 
agents exist, namely the Higher Education Quality Council, 'owned' by the 
collective universities, and the funding councils, which are tied more closely to the 
governmental services. The Association of Co-operating Universities in the 
Netherlands (VSNU) follows a strategy similar to that of the CNAA and the CVCP. 
In the quality assessment system in the Netherlands emphasis is put on the 
institution's elf-evaluation and the visit by peers. The Association itself only 
operates as the coordinator of the system. 
A second common element may be deduced from both the North-American and 
the Western-European experiences. These experiences indicate that any quality 
assessment system must be based on self-evaluation (or: self-study, self- 
assessment). It is often argued in the higher education literature that, in order for 
academics to accept and implement changes, they must trust and 'own' the process 
in which problems are defined and solutions are designed. This is certainly also the 
case in quality assessment. Only if the academics accept quality assessment astheir 
own activity, will the system be successful. Self-evaluation is a crucial mechanism 
for academics to accept a quality assessment system. Moreover, in a self-evaluation 
process (or in any set of activities in a higher education institution with a focus on 
internal quality assessment) consulting processes with outside actors (employers, 
alumni) is of great importance. 
A third common element in a general model of quality assessment certainly 
appears to be the mechanism of peer review and especially one or more site visits 
by external experts. It is crucial that these external experts hould be accepted by 
the institution to be visited as unbiased specialists in the field. They can come from 
many constituencies (including employers' organisations, industry and professional 
bodies) and, depending on the nature of the visit (review of content and level of a 
specific study programme, ormanagement audit at the institutional level), they will 
need to have specific backgrounds (academic expertise, managerial experience, 
etc.). The external visitors should visit the institution (or faculty/department) for a 
period of a few days, during which they can discuss the self-evaluation report and 
the plans for future innovations with the faculty. The visitors could also take the 
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opportunity to interview staff, students, administrators and (if possible) alumni. 
This element appears to be used successfully in both North-American and Western- 
European quality assessment systems. In the USA and Canada a visit by peers 
always has been a crucial aspect of the various assessment systems. In the UK the 
CNAA emphasised the visit by a committee of peers. The Academic Audit Unit 
saw the visit as an intense and concentrated activity (Williams 1991, pp. 7, 8). The 
procedures developed since the changes in British higher education in 1992 
continue this emphasis. Although for reasons of economy the funding councils 
abstain from visits to all faculties, all those whose quality is claimed or expected to 
deviate from the average will be visited, plus a sample of the 'satisfactory' ones. In 
France the Comitd National d'Evaluation organises at least two visits to each 
university being reviewed. In the Netherlands a team of external experts visits each 
programme site of a specific discipline. 
A fourth element of a general model of quality assessment concerns the 
reporting of the results of and experience with the methods used. Regarding this 
element it may first of all be pointed out that some form of reporting the 
conclusions of the peer review team is very useful. However, looking at the 
experiences, uch a report should not have the function of judging or ranking the 
institutions or programmes that have been visited. It rather should have as its main 
objective to help the institutions and study programmes to improve their levels of 
quality. A crucial phase in the reporting process therefore concerns providing the 
opportunity to the institutions and units that have been visited to comment on a 
draft version of the report and to formulate counter-arguments, if necessary. Also, 
in the final version of the report higher education institutions hould be able to 
indicate possible disagreements with the peer review team. Reporting the results of 
the quality assessment processes also is an important mechanism in the process of 
providing accountability to external constituencies. However, there appear to be 
various ways of offering such a report and each has its specific advantages and 
disadvantages. One way is to publish the complete report and, by so doing, offer it 
to all those who might be interested. The advantage of such an approach is that 
each constituency can immediately and clearly find out what the outcomes of an 
assessment have been and how these outcomes relate to their norms and criteria. A 
disadvantage of this approach is that it may severely limit the commitment of those 
who are visited to engage in open discussions with the peer review team, simply 
because they fear the effects of their frankness when the results of the review are 
published. A second way to report on the results of the peer review is to offer the 
detailed individual reports only to the institutions visited and to guarantee 
confidentiality. To the external constituencies (and to society at large) a general 
summary of the report can be presented, which may be used as a mechanism for 
providing accountability. The advantage of this approach is that the commitment of
those who are visited will be high. The disadvantage is that some external 
constituencies might not be satisfied with only a summary of the report, out of fear 
that information is being withheld from them. 
Regarding this element, the approaches in the various countries differ. In the 
USA and Canada the reports are usually kept confidential. In France, the CNE 
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publishes its reports on the institutions. The institutional self-evaluations are kept 
confidential, while the report by the external experts is public. In the Netherlands, 
although in the pilot phase the reports on the individual study programmes of the 
external visitors were kept confidential, since the system has been fully 
implemented the final reports, including the 'local reports,' have been made public. 
The argument for doing so is the accountability objective. In the procedures of the 
British Academic Audit Unit the audit report was intended to provide an accurate 
account of an institution's quality assurance mechanisms. The report hereby drew 
attention to good and bad practice. The report was first of all written for the 
institution and the Academic Audit Unit itself did not publish the reports. It was for 
the institution to decide what publicity to give to its reports, although it was 
assumed that the report 'finds its way into the public domain accompanied by a 
commentary prepared by the university' (Williams 1991, p. 10). 
A final common element of a general model of quality assessment concerns the 
possible relationship between the outcomes of a quality review system and the 
(governmental) decisions about he funding of higher education activities. Based on 
the experience of quality assessment in especially Western-Europe so far, we can 
argue that a direct, rigid relationship between quality review reports and funding 
decisions hould not be established. By a direct, rigid relationship we mean that the 
quality judgements are the only input into the funding process, which, moreover, is
a simple function of the quality judgement: 'good' education means x extra money, 
and 'bad' education means x money less. Such an 'automatic' direct relationship 
will probably harm the operation of a quality assessment system. All the more so as 
funding decisions presently tend to be cut backs (negative sanctions) rather than 
incentives (positive sanctions). The danger of this is that it may lead to a 
compliance culture, the only aim of which will be to appear to meet the criteria 
formulated, irrespective of whether those criteria are appropriate in the context of 
specific institutions or not. In such a rigid relationship academics and institutions 
will distrust he external review teams and they will produce self-evaluation studies 
in compliance with perceived criteria but with little real interest. Relating a system 
of rigid and direct rewards and sanctions to the delicate mechanisms of quality 
assessment may have a very negative ffect on the operation of the system. In 
France, the Comitd National d'Evaluation has understood these dangers. The 
evaluations performed by the Committee do not have a direct impact on state 
subventions to the institutions. The new procedures for quality assessment in the 
United Kingdom also do not imply a direct relationship between quality 
management and funding on a large scale. Moreover, the amounts of money 
involved in the funding councils' judgements eem to be fairly marginal for the 
moment, thereby mitigating any possible negative ffect. Also, the quality audits of 
the new quality council for higher education, continuing the role of the AAU, have 
no direct link to funding either. 
The above does not imply that an indirect, non-automatic relationship between 
quality management and funding decisions hould also be rejected. On the contrary, 
as the experiences in the USA and Canada as well as the new approaches in France 
and the United Kingdom show, such an indirect relationship, where quality 
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judgements are one - but not the only one - of the inputs into the policy processes 
leading to funding decision, could very well be part of the general model of quality 
assessment suggested here. An indirect relationship would imply that national 
governments will only provide the necessary financial means to higher education 
institutions if these institutions (and the various units within these institutions) can 
show that they have submitted themselves toat least one external judgement which 
is an accepted part of the general quality assessment system. Only if higher 
education institutions can show that they have offered their educational 
programmes for external review, should these institutions be eligible for 
governmental funding. Whether the funds provided by government are used to 
reward programmes that have been judged to be of good quality or to help 
programmes that received a negative qualification by an external review team, 
should be the decision of the higher education institution itself. It should be left to 
the discretion of the higher education i stitutions how they react o the outcomes of 
the quality assessment system. The decision to fund or not to fund an institution (or 
certain programmes within an institution) should, in this approach, only depend 
upon the willingness to submit he institutional ctivities to outside review. 
Perspective 
The elements presented here (touching upon the independent meta-level role of 
managing agent(s), upon self-evaluation, upon peer review and site visits, upon the 
degree of confidentiality of reporting, and upon the relationship between quality 
review outcomes and funding) together form the core of what could be called a 
general model of higher education quality assessment. A crucial question of course 
is whether such a general model offers a sound base for higher education 
institutions to keep their important place in society. 
At the beginning of this article we argued that through istory, higher education 
institutions have been rather successful in combining the two subcategories of the 
general concept of quality. On the one hand higher education institutions have 
always espoused the values of the search for truth and the pursuit of knowledge (the 
intrinsic qualities). On the other hand higher education institutions have responded 
with remarkable flexibility to the changing needs and pressures from their 
environment (the extrinsic qualities). 
The recent call for quality assessment in higher education appears to be largely 
inspired by the wish of governments and other societal actors to underline the 
importance of the extrinsic qualities of higher education. The increasing 
participation rates in higher education and the growing costs have led to the wish to 
try to identify as clearly as possible the various quality aspects of the processes and 
products of higher education i stitutions. 
Higher education institutions cannot be deaf to this increasing emphasis being 
put on their extrinsic qualities. As has been the case through the centuries, higher 
education i stitutions will have to respond to the call to show their value to society. 
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They will have to accept (and in several countries they already have done so) the 
coming into existence of systems of quality assessment through which they can 
show their accountability osociety. 
However, it should not be forgotten that higher education institutions also have 
the task to emphasise their intrinsic qualities. In higher education the ideals of the 
search for truth and the pursuit of knowledge cannot just simply be discarded. 
The general model of higher education quality assessment that appears to be 
developing in the various practices in several Western countries, will have to be 
judged on its capacity to combine both the intrinsic and the extrinsic dimensions of 
quality. Based on this perspective, we would like to argue that in any sensible 
system of higher education quality assessment both the traditional English model of 
a review by peers and the historical French model of providing accountability o
external constituencies should be incorporated. Focusing on only one of these two 
models leads to a risky overestimation f specific functions and practices of higher 
education institutions. A quality assessment system that only consists of peer 
review without any reference to the needs outside the higher education system, 
implies the risk of an extreme isolation of the higher education i stitutions from the 
rest of society (and thus the denial of the legitimacy of their existence). A quality 
assessment system that is limited to only providing accountability to external 
constituencies denies some of the basic characteristics of higher education 
institutions and therefore implies the risk of not being taken seriously by the 
academic experts. 
The remaining question is whether the core of the general model of quality 
assessment presented before is sufficiently able to combine the intrinsic and 
extrinsic dimensions of quality. Although it is too early to judge the empirical 
effects of the elements of the general model, it may be expected that this set of 
elements at least allows for the possibility to pay attention to the combination of 
both the intrinsic and the extrinsic dimensions of quality in higher education. The 
elements of the general model appear to deny the dominance of either of the two 
dimensions. As such, the core of the general model combines the two traditional 
approaches that are found in the history of higher education. By doing so the 
general model relates the present-day needs and experiences with the historical 
roots of higher education quality assessment. 
Note 
1. In Scotland, ajudgement 'highly satisfactory' is also possible. 
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